Single Judge Application, 38 C.F.R. 3.304(f)(5); Behavioral Changes One Type of Relevant Evidence; Menegassi v. Shinseki, 638 F. 3d 1379, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2011)

Excerpt from decision below: "The Board rejected the statements from the appellant's family members because "none of these individuals has claimed to witness any personal assault that took place in service, and these statements were submitted seventeen years following the [v]eteran's separation from her second period of active duty." R. at 23. However, the statements submitted by the appellant's brother and sister-in-law addressed behavioral changes in the appellant between the time she joined the military and the time she returned from Spain. See R. at 386-87, 407-08, 812, 816. Evidence of behavioral changes is "one type of relevant evidence" that may corroborate the appellant's account of the in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(5)." ============================ "Furthermore, this Court has stated that "[i]f in the process of identifying these potential sources [under §3.304 (f)(5)], a claimant provides the name or names of any persons who allegedly perpetrated the assault or the names of any potential witnesses, the Secretary's reasonable efforts to assist, as required under section 5103A(a), may also include attempting to assist the claimant in obtaining statements from these persons." Forcier v. Nicholson 19 Vet.App. 414, 422 (2006) (citing Patton, 12 Vet.App. at 280-81). The Court notes that on at least two occasions, the appellant provided names of people to whom she contemporaneously reported her in-service stressors. See R. at 378, 404-05. During her June 2008 testimony before the RO, while explaining the April 1983 assault at the softball field at Portsmouth Naval Hospital, she identified the month and year of the attack, and the name of the chief to whom she described the incident. See R. at 378. When she described being beaten by her husband for not hiding his alcohol well enough, she explained that she told her husband's petty officer and his wife. See R. at 404-05. Based on these descriptions,including the names and ranks of the individuals who might have knowledge of the event, the Board erred in concluding that the Secretary satisfied his duty to assist where he made no effort to help the appellant corroborate her stressor. See Forcier, 19 Vet.App. at 422 (finding the duty to assist had been satisfied where the Board had ordered the RO to "pursue all available avenues to assist [the veteran] in locating anyone identified for a statement regarding the claimed incident, including the two sergeants he had identified by name")." ============================ ---------------------------------------------------- Designated for electronic publication only UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS NO. 11-3621 BC, APPELLANT, V. ERIC K. SHINSEKI, SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, APPELLEE. Before SCHOELEN, Judge. MEMORANDUM DECISION Note: Pursuant to U.S. Vet. App. R. 30(a), this action may not be cited as precedent. SCHOELEN, Judge: The appellant, through counsel,appeals the February9, 2011, decision of the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) that denied entitlement to disability compensation for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include post-traumatic stress disorder ( PTSD). Record of Proceedings (R.) at 3-24. This appeal is timely and the Court has jurisdiction to review the Board's decision pursuant to 38 U.S.C. §§ 7252(a) and 7266(a). Single-judge disposition is appropriate. See Frankel v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 23, 25-26 (1990). For the reasons that follow, the Court will vacatetheFebruary9,2011, Boarddecisionandremandthematterforfurtherproceedings consistent with this decision. I. BACKGROUND The appellant served in the U.S. Navyfrom October 1982 to October 1986, and from August 1990 to June 1991, with additional Reserve service. R. at 175, 982, 1491. In April 1984, the appellant married a fellow Navyservicemember and requested to be transferred to the naval hospital in Rota, Spain, where the appellant's spouse was assigned. R. at 438. The appellant was thereafter transferred. R. at 452. The appellant gave birth to her first child in December 1984. R. at 559. The narrative summarystates that during delivery she underwent a "third degree midline episiotomy and repair." Id. Theappellant's June1986separationphysicaldid not note anypsychological conditions. R. at 588-89. In October 1986, the appellant declined reenlistment and requested release from active duty and returned to the United States. R. at 416. Medical examination reports from December 1987, February 1990, and June 1991 did not note any psychological conditions. R. at 594-95, 599-600, 609-10. A September 1998 psychiatric consult report indicates that the appellant " entered treatment because of severe depression which she has been experiencing for four years since her left hand was caught in machinery at work." R. at 1443. The doctor diagnosed her with "[ m]ajor depression, single episode, moderate." Id. A January 2001 private treatment report indicates that the appellant suffers from "reflex sympathetic dystrophy" following surgery after her hand injuryNext Hit in 1994. R. at 1414. The report further stated that the appellant and her husband were having " difficulties" and that he tried to make "her into a stronger person but recently threatened to divorce her." Id. The appellant reported a history of childhood sexual and physical abuse by her stepfather. R. at 1415. She was diagnosed with depression, not otherwise specified. Id. A further January2001 psychiatric evaluation, following a hospitalization for the appellant's severe major depression related to use of Oxycontin, noted chronic pain with subsequent reflex sympathetic dystrophy; depression; family stresses including trouble with her marriage; and "past trauma with residual symptoms exacerbated by her pain and the trauma of the injuries and subsequent reflex sympathetic dystrophy and chronic pain." R. at 1289. The doctor noted that the appellant "suffered physical and sexual abuse from a stepfather and felt betrayed by her mother who rejected the [appellant's] complaints abouttheabuse." R. at 1290. The appellant was diagnosed with "[m]ajor depression, recurrent, with winter exacerbations, currently in partial remission" and "PTSD." Id. The doctor's diagnostic impressions noted that the appellant had a "complex pattern of PTSD" and "recurrent major depression with seasonal exacerbation." Id. He further noted that "[b]oth the depression and the PTSD have been exacerbated by the chronic pain syndrome and secondary disability reflex sympathetic dystrophy" and that her " exacerbation of depression may have been related in part to the Oxycontin." Id. 2 In an April 2001 progress note, the doctor noted that the appellant admitted that she "tends not to let her physicians know how she is doing" because she does not want to complain. R. at 1291. The doctor opined that "[i]t becomes clear as I get to know her that she has some maladaptive coping traits related to her chronic illness that involve not wanting to complain and withdrawing from contact and some sense of defeat." Id. A May 2001 psychiatric treatment note indicates that the appellant was admitted to the hospital for "suicidal and homicidal ideation." R. at 1333. The doctor noted that the appellant "has had significant problems with jealousy about another woman that has been working with her husband, and the woman has been very forthright about wanting her husband." Id. The doctor also indicated that the appellant had been "somewhat secretive with her physicians about some of her problems." Id. A mental status examination noted that the appellant had " bad dreams, flashbacks, recurrent intrusive memories, and some exaggerated startle response episodically." R. at 1334. She was diagnosed with major depression, PTSD, and chronic pain. Id. In May 2004, the appellant filed a claim for disability compensation for PTSD, arguing that its onset was 1985. R. at 1052. A June 2004 VA psychiatrynote states that the appellant "continues to suffer chronic PTSD symptoms secondaryto significant sexual trauma while in the [U.S.] Navy." R. at 1023-24, 1045. In August 2004, the regional office (RO) denied the appellant's claim for PTSD based on a lack of evidence of in-service sexual trauma. R. at 1018-21. The appellant did not appeal the denial. In January 2005, the RO requested that the appellant complete a PTSD questionnaire, but there is no evidence in the record that she responded. R. at 1010-11. The appellant again filed a claim for disability compensation for PTSD in November 2006. R. at 990-1009. Accompanying the claim were three letters from her treating VA psychiatrist, which stated that the appellant's "depressive symptoms and PTSD symptoms originated following a sexual trauma and abuse she sustained while in the Navy." R. at 984-88. In February 2007, the appellant submitted a personal trauma PTSD questionnaire. R. at 964-71. She explained that her former husband, a member of the U.S. Navy, had physically and sexually assaulted her while they were serving in Spain. In a separate February 2007, 11-page statement the appellant again described her former husband's physical abuse, and described in greater detail what occurred while they were assigned to Spain: 3 I had not know[n] about the anger and rage [my former husband] could show until I married him and was stationed in Spain. I had no one to turn to. The command was very small and he made friends easily. He began to offer me sexually to [ one of his friends] . . . . I gave birth to our first child Dec[ember] 1984 in Rota Spain. During delivery I suffered a [third] degree laceration and rectal sphin[c]ter prolapse . . . . [T]wo weeks of forced sexual advances by spouse . . . result[ed] in the sutures in my episiotomy ripping open. R. at 950. She also explained that her husband repeatedly slapped her and choked her. R. at 952. The appellant and her daughter lived in a hotel during the appellant's final two weeks of duty in Spain, and returned to the United States in December 1986. R. at 956. Additionally, the appellant described being accidently stuck with two contaminated needles while she was stationed at Portsmouth Naval Hospital. R. at 944. She also described being assaulted by a U.S. Navy "chief" on a softball field while other enlisted U.S. Navy service members watched. R. at 944-46. In April 2007, the RO reopened the appellant's claim for entitlement to disability compensation for PTSD, but denied the claim on its merits. R. at 898-902. The appellant submitted a Notice of Disagreement (NOD) in May 2007. R. at 894. In August 2007, the RO issued a Statement of the Case, which confirmed and continued denial of the appellant's claim for disability compensation for PTSD. R. at 835-49. After the RO received the appellant's NOD, the RO received medical records from the Batavia VA medical center (VAMC). R. at 850-80. The records indicate an assessment of PTSD, "chronic with delayed onset." R. at 850. Additionally, the records state that the appellant "continues to present as a domestic violence victim" and that she has "chronic PTSD related to her 17 year historyof severe domestic violence byher spouse, including physical, emotional, psychological, and sexual abuse." R. at 857, 864. The records also note that the appellant had "preexisting trauma history due to experienc[ing] severe child abuse, including physical, emotional, and sexual abuse in her family by her stepfather." R. at 864. An April 2007 list of future appointments included a February 2008 appointment with the Women's Residential Program at the Batavia VAMC. R. at 866. In February 2008, the RO received statements from the appellant's brother and sister-in-law. Her brother stated that they were "raised to be strong, independent, and responsible persons. But [he] had watched that person disappear in [the appellant's] case." R. at 816. He explained: 4 When [appellant] finished high school she went into the military it seemed she had [found] her calling[,] but things changed after that point. We did not hear much from her for about 2-3 years. The next time we were together was when she returned [from] Spain with a husband and two young children. This is when I really had a chance to see the change in [the appellant]. The stories [she] came home with were unbelievable to me as to how her life had changed. . . . She was very paranoid she seemed to think everyone was out to get her and she was never wrong no matter the situation. She became very combative with all of her family members over the slightest of issues. . . . We tried to help in bringing her husband . . . home for a weekend to see his family [which] brought to our attention the situation with [the appellant's husband] having an affair. R. at 816. Her brother further explained that after the appellant moved to Maryland he found her "unable to cope with day to day issues and activities" and that a short while later she "was on a continuous [downward] trend" and that she would often call for advice because she was unable to make a decision on her own." Id. The appellant's brother also explained that after the appellant and her husband moved to Idaho, he "wanted to bring another woman in to live in [appellant's] home and share him between the two of them." Id. He explained that eventually the appellant "moved to a shelter to try and help herself and two of her children." R. at 818. The appellant's sister-in-law also wrote a letter to VA, explaining that she had known the appellant for 25 years and that [w]hen [she] first met [the appellant] she displayed a strong sense of self-being as well as a very strong personality. She was very decisive and secure in her decisions. [The appellant] returned from Spain where her husband and she herself were stationed in the Navy. She and her two children stayed with my in-laws while her husband [] went [away] to school in Colorado. During this time [the appellant] was very over-protective of her children to the point of paranoia. . . . My husband [] and I thought it was the stress of being away from her husband with two children. We purchased a ticket for [her husband] to come home on a weekend to visit as a surprise for [the appellant]. When we called him he refused to come home citing that he was going hunting. After [the appellant's husband] called [the appellant] about the surprise she begged us to never interfere with [her husband's] plans again. I was very surprised myself at her complete terror that we would ask [the appellant's husband] to change his plans again. R. at 812. Additionally, the appellant's sister-in-law stated that she had witnessed the appellant's husband trying to strangle the appellant, and the appellant's daughter informed the sister-in-law that 5 the appellant's husband beat the children and the appellant and that he had insisted that the appellant should kill herself "because she was useless." R. at 814. The appellant perfected her appeal to the Board in April 2008. R. at 792. In June 2008, the RO received a letter from the appellant's treating VA social worker, in which he stated that he had been treating the appellant since October 2007 and that she was in active treatment for PTSD "secondary to military sexual trauma that she experienced during her military tour of duty." R. at 740. The social worker explained that the appellant had completedtwo segments of residential care at Batavia VAMC. Id. He opined that the appellant continued to suffer from the symptoms of PTSD "that is specifically related to the events that occurred to her during her military service." Id. The appellant testified before an RO hearing in June 2008. R. at 373-411. She testified that she was receiving mental health treatment from the Buffalo VAMC. R. at 376. She explained that she had been married to her husband from 1984 to 2003, and that he "taught me how our life was going to be and how he was the head of the household and things were going to be his way. If I even tried to change it there was hell to pay." R. at 384. She provided detailed testimony as to various incidents of domestic violence and sexual assault she suffered while in service, at the hands of her husband, including his giving her as a "gift" to his friends. R. at 378- 411. After discussing the incident where her husband hit her for not hiding his alcohol well enough in their luggage, she explained that she did not report her husband's abuse because "[i]t was the way [she] was raised. That you find the good in everybody and [she] kept looking for the good and [she] couldn't believe that this could[] be the man [she] met and [she] married and had children with." R. at 386. The appellant further explained: I was working in the Pediatric Clinic and [my husband] came and got me and there was a filing cabinet out [] where records were kept and it said in huge letters FAR. I didn't know what they meant. He pulled me out of my clinic and said you see that cabinet and I said yeah and he said our files will never be in it. Well, later on I learned they were Family Advocacy Records. They were families that were in abusive situations. And he told me in no uncertain terms ours would never be in there. So no matter what he did ours weren't going in there. R. at 391. However, during her RO hearing testimony the appellant explained that she had told Petty Officer Jeff Connor and his wife Lisa Connor about what happened right before the couple left 6 Spain. R. at 404-05. At the hearing, the appellant's brother testified that when she returned from Spain the appellant was not the same person she had been before she joined the Navy. R. at 386-87, 407-08. He explained that when she returned from Spain, she "could not make her own decisions so somebody always had to tell her what to do or, I mean basic things. . . . [ The appellant's former husband] would just tell her exactly what he wanted and how to do it." R. at 387. During the hearing, the appellant also detailed the incident that occurred in April 1983 at the softball field at Portsmouth Naval Hospital. R. at 377-78. She stated that she reported the incident to "Chief Beeler," but that nothing was done. R. at 378. In March 2009, VA received a November 2008 letter from the appellant's treating psychiatrist, stating that the appellant has been diagnosed with chronic and severe PTSD, related to sexual trauma and abuse she sustained while she was serving in the U.S. Navy. R. at 355. The same month, the RO received an April 2002 psychological evaluation of the appellant's family prepared inconjunction with divorceproceedings, specificallyfordeterminingthebestparentingarrangement for the appellant's children. R. at 261-351. The evaluation, based on interviews with family members and psychological testing for the adults, indicated that the appellant's husband "tends to be somewhat competitive and needs to see himself as masculine. He probably prefers to view women in subservient roles. Interpersonally, he is likely to be intolerant and insensitive, and others may find him rather crude, coarse, or narrow-minded." R. at 315. The psychologist noted that two of the couple's three children lived with the appellant "in a location that they wished not to be disclosed" to their father, the appellant's husband. R. at 269. The appellant told the psychologists that she had not left her husband earlier because of her religious upbringing and Navy training that taught her to "do what [she] is told." R. at 271. The appellant's oldest daughter described her father as "aggressive and physically abusive." R. at 291. The appellant's son explained that he initially lived with his father to "avoid a spankin[g]," but his father would not let him see his mother on weekends, so ultimately he decided to live with the appellant. R. at 309. Also in March 2009, the appellant's oldest daughter submitted a statement to the RO discussing the family dynamic. R. at 179-238. She stated that her father often hit her younger sister and that he would pull her "up and down the stairs" by her hair, would hold her down by her hair to 7 the point that "chunks of hair would be missing from her head." R. at 181. She also explained that her father forced her to tell her school counselor that she had lied when she told the counselor that her father spanked her sister a lot. R. at 191. She further described being beaten with a belt when she was 15 years old and being punched in the face by her father. R. at 199. In June 2009, the RO again denied the appellant's claim. R. at 53-56. The Board issued the February 2011 decision currently before the Court. R. at 3-24. In its decision, the Board found that the duty to assist was satisfied because "[t]he [v]eteran has not identified, and the record does not otherwise indicate, any additional existing evidence that is necessary for a fair adjudication of the claim that has not been obtained." R. at 10. It also found that an examination was not warranted because the record "does not show a verified [in-service] stressor or any evidence of [in-service] psychiatric complaints, treatment, or diagnosis." R. at 9. The Board also discussed that "[t]here was no indication in the service treatment records [(STRs)] that either of [the appellant's] pregnancies resulted from sexual assault. In fact, STRs include no evidence of trauma that could not be verified or explained as due to an event other than sexual trauma." R. at 14. The Board found that the preponderance of the evidence was against finding that any non-PTSD psychiatric disability was related to service, citing the absence of psychiatric complaints or treatment in the service medical records (SMRs) and the seven-year gap betweentheappellant's separationfromserviceand the first documentation of a psychiatric disorder. R. at 19. With regard to PTSD, the Board noted that "[n]either the service personnel records nor the [SMRs] from service document any in-service personal assault. Records show that the [v]eteran was married and had children during her period of service." R. at 21. After discussing the VA diagnosis of PTSD related to in-service physical and sexual trauma, the Board noted "that the PTSD diagnos[e]s have been based solely on statements from the Veteran, and that it [is] not supported byevidence of a confirmed in-service stressor." R. at 22. The Board indicated that it was "pertinent that the [v]eteran never reported any incidents of [in-service] assault until after she originally filed a claim for entitlement to service connection in June 2004." Id. In finding that the record did not corroborate the appellant's accounts of her husband's assaults, the Board cited the absence of documentation in the service records that the appellant had reported the assaults or "instigated proceedings against her alleged attacker." R. at 23. 8 The Board, after noting their competence, rejected the statements made by the appellant's family members because "none of these individuals has claimed to witness any personal assault that took place in service, and these statements were submitted seventeen years following the [v]eteran's separation from her second period of active duty." Id. The Board found the VA medical opinions that the appellant's PTSD was caused by in-service assault unpersuasive because the providers did not have access to the claims file prior to rendering their opinions, and "[ e]ven if they did . . . it is clear that the record does not contain evidence to verify that a personal assault occurred." R. at 25. II. ANALYSIS To establish service connection for PTSD, a claimant must present (1) evidence of a current diagnosis of PTSD; (2) evidence of an in-service stressor, with credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred; and (3) evidence of a causal nexus between the current symptomatology and the in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(2012); see Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet.App. 128, 138 (1997). When a claim for PTSD is based on a noncombat stressor, "the noncombat veteran's testimony alone is insufficient proof of a stressor." Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 389, 396 (1996). In claims for PTSD based on an in-service personal assault, "evidence from sources other than the veteran's service records may corroborate the veteran's account of the stressor incident." 38 C.F.R. §3.304(f)(5); see Bradford v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 200, 205 (2006). The types of corroborating evidence include, but are not limited to " records from law enforcement authorities, rape crisis centers, mental health counseling centers, hospitals, or physicians; pregnancy tests or tests for sexually transmitted diseases; and statements from family members, roommates, fellow service members, or clergy." 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(5). Additionally, "[e]vidence of behavior changes following the claimed assault is one type of relevant evidence that maybe found in these sources." 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)( 5). Evidence indicating a change in behavior includes, "but is not limited to: a request for a transfer to another military duty assignment; deterioration in work performance; substance abuse; episodes of depression, panic attacks, or anxiety without an identifiable cause; or unexplained economic or social changes." 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(5). The Court reviews the Board's factual determination as to the sufficiency of corroborative 9 evidence of the in-service stressor under the "clearly erroneous" standard of review. See 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(4); Sizemore v. Principi, 18 Vet.App. 264, 270 (2004) (citing Pentecost v. Principi, 16 Vet.App. 124, 129 (2002)) (regarding corroborative evidence). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when the Court, after reviewing the entire evidence, "is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1984); see also Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 49, 52 (1990). A. Adequate Statement of Reasons or Bases The Board must provide a statement of the reasons or bases for its determination, adequate to enable an appellant to understand the precise basis for its decision, as well as to facilitate review in this Court. 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1); see Allday v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 517, 527 (1995); Gilbert, 1 Vet.App. at 56-57. To comply with this requirement, the Board must analyze the credibility and probative value of the evidence, account for the evidence it finds persuasive or unpersuasive, and provide the reasons for its rejection of any material evidence favorable to the claimant. Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 498, 506 (1995), aff'd per curiam,78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (table). Whatever the type of evidence, it is the Board's province to determine its credibility and weight. See Washington v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 362, 367-68 (2005); Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 190, 193 (1991). The credibility of a witness can be impeached by a showing of interest, bias, inconsistent statements, or, to a certain extent, bad character. See Caluza, 7 Vet.App. at 511. The Board rejected the statements from the appellant's family members because "none of these individuals has claimed to witness any personal assault that took place in service, and these statements were submitted seventeen years following the [v]eteran's separation from her second period of active duty." R. at 23. However, the statements submitted by the appellant's brother and sister-in-law addressed behavioral changes in the appellant between the time she joined the military and the time she returned from Spain. See R. at 386-87, 407-08, 812, 816. Evidence of behavioral changes is "one type of relevant evidence" that may corroborate the appellant's account of the in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(5). Consequently, the Board failed to provide an adequate statement of reasons or bases for rejecting the statements made by the appellant's family members without discussing their belief that the appellant's behavior changed between the time she entered the military and she returned from Spain. Caluza, 7 Vet.App. at 506. 10 The Board further erred when it found the appellant's statements regarding her in-service physical and sexual abuse had no probative value because they were inconsistent, specifically because the appellant did not report the in-service assault until after she filed a claim for entitlement to service connection in June 2004. R. at 22. Although it is true that the appellant only discussed childhood physical and sexual trauma during psychiatric treatment she received prior to June 2004, the Board failed to address the appellant's testimony that while she was married she was afraid to report the sexual and physical abuse she suffered from her husband. The appellant remained married until July 2002. R. at 1006, 1055. The appellant testified that her husband controlled her behavior and threatened her if she told anyone of his actions. See R. at 384 ( testimony from the appellant that her husband taught her that "he was the head of the household and things were going to be his way. If [she] tried to change it there was hell to pay."); R. at 387 (testimony that the appellant's husband was controlling and that she was not allowed to make decisions); R. at 391 ( testimony about her husband threatening that their family would never appear in the Family Advocacy Records); R. at 812 (letter from the appellant's sister-in-law stating that the appellant was "afraid for her children and herself" and describing fear that the appellant showed after her husband was asked to visit by her brother). Nor did the Board discuss that psychological testing performed during the appellant's divorce proceedings showed that the appellant's husband needed to "see himself as masculine" and that he preferred to "view women in subservient roles, that interpersonally, he is likely to be intolerant and insensitive, and others may find him rather crude, coarse, or narrow-minded." R. at 315. Additionally, the Board did not discuss the evidence from the appellant's mental health providers from 2001, who stated that she had "maladaptive copingtraits related to her chronicillness that involve not wanting to complain, withdrawing from contact and some sense of defeat" and that the appellant had been "somewhat secretive with her physicians about some of the problems." R. at 1291, 1333. Therefore, the Board erred by not providing an adequate statement of reasons or bases that provided reasons for its rejection of evidence favorable to the appellant. Caluza, 7 Vet.App. at 506. Furthermore, the Board relied on the fact that the appellant's STRs do not document any personal assault. The Board stated that the "[r]ecords show that the [v] eteran was married and had children during her period of service"; that the appellant never " instigated proceedings against her 11 alleged attacker"; and that there was no notation that her pregnancy was the result of sexual assault; therefore, "the evidence does not support the assertion that she was sexually assaulted by the one who fathered the child." R. at 21-23. The Court is not persuaded by the Board's reasoning. Although the appellant's service medical records do not report that her pregnancy was the result of personal assault, they do not contradict her claimed in-service stressor that she was physically and sexually abused by her husband. Buczynski v. Shinskei, 24 Vet.App. 221, 224 (2011) ("When assessing a claim, the Board may not consider the absence of evidence as substantive negative evidence."); see Patton v. West, 12 Vet.App. 272, 277 (1999) (acknowledging VA Adjudication Procedures Manual's recognition that, "[b]ecause assault is an extremely personal and sensitive issue, many incidents of personal assault are not officially reported"). There is no medical reason why a doctor would be expected to comment on how a woman became pregnant, especially if the father of the child is her husband, making it less likely that the appellant's medical records would report assault. See Buczynksi, 24 Vet.App. at 224. The Court finds no more availing the Secretary's argument that the Board "appears to have misstated its intended finding" and "should be reasonably read to relate its finding that the only evidence from the same . . . period [as the alleged in-service abuse] leans toward a finding that [the a]ppellant was trying to become pregnant by her husband." Secretary's Brief (Br.) at 23 n.10 (emphasis in original). Although the appellant's medical records do not directly prove that the appellant was sexually assaulted by her husband, the Board cannot dismiss the appellant's assertions that she was sexually and physicallyassaulted, simply because she asserts it was her husband who assaulted her. Therefore, the Board's statement of reasons and bases is inadequate to enable this Court to perform judicial review. See 38 U.S. C. § 7104(d)(1); see also Allday and Gilbert, both supra. Because the Board provided an inadequate statement of reasons and bases for its conclusions that the appellant's account of her in-service physical and sexual assault was not credible, failed to address evidence regarding behavioral changes, and relied on the lack of evidence in the appellant's service medical records, the Court will vacate the Board's findings and remand the matter for further proceedings. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Tucker v. West, 11 Vet.App. 369, 374 (1998) ("[W]here the Board has incorrectly applied the law, failed to provide an adequate statement of reasons or bases for its determinations, or where the record is otherwise 12 inadequate, a remand is the appropriate remedy."). B. Duty To Assist 1. Corroborating In-Service Stressor The Secretary has a duty to assist pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(a), under which he must make "reasonable efforts to assist a claimant in obtaining the evidence necessary to substantiate the claimant's claim for a benefit under a law administered by the Secretary." If, however, the evidence obtained indicates that there is no reasonable possibility that further assistance would substantiate the claim, "VA will discontinue providing assistance in obtaining evidence for a claim." 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(a); see Wensch v. Principi, 15 Vet.App. 362, 368 (2001) (holding that when there is extensive factual development in a case that indicates no reasonable possibility that any further assistance would aid the appellant in substantiating his claim, the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) does not apply). Here, the Board found that VA had fulfilled the duty to assist because it " had made reasonable efforts to obtain any pertinent records as well as all relevant records adequately identified by the [v]eteran." R. at 9. The Board continued by explaining that VA sent the appellant a PTSD questionnaire "asking for information or evidence other than service records or evidence of behavior changes that may constitute credible supporting evidence of an in-service stressor." Id. The appellant argues that the Board failed in its duty to assist because the RO should have requested records from VA psychiatric treatment at the Buffalo and Batavia VAMCs. Appellant's Br. at 12. She asserts that the post-July 2007 treatment records are relevant because they might "contain findings that would confirm the in-service assault bythe [a]ppellant's former husband." Id. at 13. The Secretary responds that "given that the Board rejected [the a] ppellant's claims of having suffered personal assault in service, there is no reason to believe that treatment records dated after July 2007 would have any tendency to substantiate her claim." Secretary's Br. at 10-11. After finding error in the Board's assessment of the appellant's credibility, the Court disagrees with the Secretary. In this case, the appellant is missing corroboration of her in-service stressor to substantiate her PTSD claim. Medical opinion evidence can by submitted for use in determining whether the occurrence of a stressor is corroborated. See Menegassi v. Shinseki, 638 F. 3d 1379, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 13 2011). In its decision, the Board discounted all PTSD diagnoses because they were based on statements made by the appellant. R. at 22. Therefore, if the medical records identified by the appellant provide an opinion about her in-service stressor, such as the record of the doctor commenting on the family's statements that the appellant's behavior changed after her first period of service, the records might corroborate of the appellant's in-service stressor. See Menegassi, 638 F.3d at 1382. Additionally, as noted above, the Court has vacated the Board's determination that the appellant was not credible in reporting her in-service physical and sexual assault. Therefore, the Board erred in dismissing all the PTSD diagnoses because they were based on statements by the appellant. See id. Consequently, the Board erred by finding that it fulfilled its duty to assist. 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(a). Furthermore, this Court has stated that "[i]f in the process of identifying these potential sources [under §3.304 (f)(5)], a claimant provides the name or names of any persons who allegedly perpetrated the assault or the names of any potential witnesses, the Secretary's reasonable efforts to assist, as required under section 5103A(a), may also include attempting to assist the claimant in obtaining statements from these persons." Forcier v. Nicholson 19 Vet.App. 414, 422 (2006) (citing Patton, 12 Vet.App. at 280-81). The Court notes that on at least two occasions, the appellant provided names of people to whom she contemporaneously reported her in-service stressors. See R. at 378, 404-05. During her June 2008 testimony before the RO, while explaining the April 1983 assault at the softball field at Portsmouth Naval Hospital, she identified the month and yearof the attack, and the name of the chief to whom she described the incident. See R. at 378. When she described being beaten by her husband for not hiding his alcohol well enough, she explained that she told her husband's petty officer and his wife. See R. at 404-05. Based on these descriptions, including the names and ranks of the individuals who might have knowledge of the event, the Board erred in concluding that the Secretary satisfied his duty to assist where he made no effort to help the appellant corroborate her stressor. See Forcier, 19 Vet.App. at 422 (finding the duty to assist had been satisfied where the Board had ordered the RO to "pursue all available avenues to assist [the veteran] in locating anyone identified for a statement regarding the claimed incident, including the two sergeants he had identified by name"). 14 The Court's analysis does not end with a conclusion that the Board committed error; rather, the Court is required to determine whether the appellant was prejudiced by the Board's error. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(2) (requiring the Court to "take due account of the rule of prejudicial error"); Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 414 (2009). Here, the Secretary argues that any error in not seeking additional records is nonprejudicial because the appellant lacks credible evidence of an in- service stressor or event to which such disability could be linked. Secretary's Br. at 10. The Court disagrees. The Court has vacated the Board's credibility determination. With the Secretary's assistance, the appellant may have been able to provide credible evidence of her in-service stressor, therefore, the error is prejudicial. 2. Providing Medical Examination The Secretary's duty to assist requires that VA provide a medical examination to a claimant when there is (1) competent evidence of a current disability or persistent or recurrent symptoms of a disability; (2) evidence establishing that an event, Previous HitinjuryNext Hit, or disease occurred in service, or for certain diseases, manifestation of the disease during an applicable presumptive period for which the claimant qualifies; and (3) an indiction that the disability or persistent or recurrent symptoms of the disability may be associated with the veteran's service or with another service-connected disability; but (4) insufficient competent medical evidence on file for the Secretary to make a decision on the claim. 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(d); McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 79, 81 ( 2006); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c) (4)(i) (2012). "The Board's ultimate conclusion that a medical examination is not necessary pursuant to section 5103A(d)(2) is reviewed under the 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law' standard of review." McLendon, 20 Vet.App. at 81 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(3)(A)). In Menegassi, 638 F.3d at 1382, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) held that under § 3.304(f)(5), "medical opinion evidence may be submitted for use in determining whether the occurrence of a stressor is corroborated." See also Patton, 12 Vet.App. at 280 (rejecting the requirement that "something more than medical nexus evidence is required to fulfill the requirement of 'credible supporting evidence'" in personal- assault cases (quoting Cohen, 10 Vet.App. at 145)). Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that a favorable medical opinion diagnosing PTSD must be weighed against all other evidence of record for purposes of determining 15 whethera claimed in-service sexual assault has been corroborated. Menegassi, 638 F.3d at 1382 n.1. Here, the Board found that the appellant was not entitled to an examination because the "evidence of record does not show a verified in[-]service stressor or any evidence of in[-]service psychiatric complaints, treatments or diagnosis." R. at 9-10. The Board found that any medical opinion linking a currently diagnosed psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD, to service would be "speculative at best." Id. The appellant argues that "[a]lthough a verified in-service stressor is required for an award of PTSD service connection . . . all that is necessary to satisfy the pertinent requirement for the provision of a VA examination is evidence of 'an event, Previous HitinjuryNext Document, or disease in service.'" Appellant's Br. at 13 (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4)(i)(B)). She further argues that her brother and sister-in-law both stated that her behavior changed during her first period of service; sincestatementsmadebyfamilymembersdocumentingbehaviorchangesduringservicec to verify an in-service assault, then she has submitted evidence that an event happened in service. Appellant's Br. at 14. The Secretary argues that an examination is not warranted because the Board found that a medical examination "would not provide any reasonable possibility of assisting her in substantiating her claim." Secretary's Br. at 6. The Court disagrees. As noted above, the Board erred when it failed to provide an adequate statement of reasons and bases for rejecting both family statements about the change in her behavior and the appellant's assertions that during service she was physically and sexually assaulted by her husband. Therefore, after properly determining the probative value of the appellant's and her family members' statements about her in-service physical and sexual assault, the Board should reevaluate the need for a VA medical examination. See McLendon, 20 Vet.App. at 81-86 (describing the circumstances in which the Secretary must provide a VA medical examination and noting that the nexus prong is a "low threshold"). C. Other Arguments Based on the Court's disposition of this case, the Court finds that it is not necessaryto address any of the appellant's additional arguments. See Best v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 18, 20 (2001) (per curiam order) (holding that "[a] narrow decision preserves for the appellant an opportunity to argue those claimed errors before the Board at readjudication, and, of course, before this Court in an appeal, should the Board rule against him"). 16 On remand,the appellant is free to submit additional evidence and argument on the remanded matters, and the Board is required to consider any such relevant evidence and argument. See Kay v. Principi, 16 Vet.App. 529, 534 (2002) (stating that, on remand the Board must consider additional evidence and argument in assessing entitlement to benefit sought). The Court has held that "[a] remand is meant to entail a critical examination of the justification for the decision." Fletcher v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 394, 397 (1991). The Board must proceed expeditiously, in accordance with 38 U.S.C. § 7112 (requiring the Secretary to provide for "expeditious treatment" of claims remanded by the Court). III. CONCLUSION After consideration of the appellant's and the Secretary's pleadings, and a review of the record, the Board's February 9, 2011, decision is VACATED and the matter is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this decision. DATED: September 14, 2012 Copies to: Glenn R. Bergmann, Esq. VA General Counsel (027) 17